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TAKING SUSPICION SERIOUSLY: THE RELIGIOUS 
USES OF MODERN ATHEISM 
Merold Westphal 
The atheism of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud can be called the atheism of suspicion in 
contrast to evidential atheism. For while the latter focuses on the truth of religious beliefs, 
the former inquires into their function. It asks, in other words, what motives lead to belief 
and what practices are compatible with and authorised by religious beliefs. The primary 
response of Christian philosophers should not be to refute these analyses, since they are 
all too often true and, moreover, very much of the same sort as found in the religion 
critique of Jesus and the prophets. Rather, our primary response should be to show the 
Christian community, including ourselves, how even the truth can become an instrument 
of self-interest. In this way the atheism of suspicion can provide helpful conceptual tools 
for personal and corporate self-examination. 
It is not every form of modem atheism that I have in mind. It is, in particular, 
the atheism of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, three of the most widely influential 
atheists of the modem era. The decision to focus on these three requires a 
simultaneous broadening and narrowing of the meaning of 'atheism'. 
To begin, 'atheism' comes to be used as a synonym for religious unbelief in 
a broad and inclusive sense. It includes both the atheist proper, who purports to 
know that God does not exist, and the agnostic who, with a kind of Socratic 
ignorance, only purports to know that we don't or can't know whether God 
exists or not. Further, atheism is no longer limited to the issue of God's mere 
existence, but also includes major claims about the nature and activity of God. 
Nor are its negations limited to the propositional content of the religious life. 
They extend from theory to practice with the claim that the liturgical, devotional, 
and ethical practices of the religious life are rationally impermissible or at best 
unwarranted. 
There is a narrowness, however, which corresponds to this broadness of usage. 
For Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud are representative of a specific type of atheism, 
a type different from the type which has dominated European philosophy of 
religion from at least the time of Gaunilo through Kant and which continues to 
this day to hold center stage in Anglo-American discussion. This latter type, 
which we can call evidential atheism, is nowhere better summarized than in 
Bertrand Russell's account of what he would say to God if the two were ever 
to meet and God were to ask him why he had not been a believer: ''I'd say, 'Not 
enough evidence God! Not enough evidence!'''1 
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Following Ricoeur, who has designated Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as the 
"masters" of the "school of suspicion,"2 we can speak of the atheism of suspicion 
in distinction from evidential atheism. Suspicion can be distinguished from Carte-
sian doubt and the epistemological tradition governed by it in that Cartesian 
doubt is directed toward the elusiveness and opacity of things or facts, while 
suspicion is directed toward the evasiveness and mendacity of consciousness. 3 
Its target is not the proposition but the person who affirms it, not the belief but 
the believer. Its attack on the theory and practice of religion is an indirect one, 
whose immediate goal is to discredit the believing soul. 
In other words, suspicion assumes that the task of epistemological reflection 
is not completed until the problem of false consciousness is met head on. It 
assumes, in Ricoeur's words, that "representation obeys not only a law of inten-
tionality, which makes it the expression of some object, but also another law, 
which makes it the manifestation of life, of an effort or desire. It is because of 
the interference of the latter expressive function that representation can be dis-
torted. Thus representation may be investigated in two ways: on the one hand, 
by a gnoseology (or criteriology) according to which representation is viewed 
as an intentional relation ruled by objects that manifest themselves in that inten-
tionality, and on the other hand by an exegesis of the desires that lie hidden in 
that intentionality." Either project by itself would be reductive and abstract. The 
moment of suspicion is necessary to keep before us "the nonautonomy of knowl-
edge, its rootedness in existence, the latter being understood as desire and effort. 
Thereby is discovered not only the unsurpassable nature of life, but the interfer-
ence of desire with intentionality, upon which desire inflicts an invincible obscur-
ity, an ineluctable partiality. "4 
The difference between these two types of reflection can be illustrated from 
David Hume's philosophy of religion. In his Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion and in Sections X and XI of An Enquiry Concerning Human Under-
standing he asks familiar questions about whether there is sufficient evidence to 
provide rational support for belief in God and miracles. But in the Introduction 
to The Natural History of Religion Hume distinguishes between such questions 
"concerning lreligion's] foundation in reason" and those "concerning its origin 
in human nature. "5 
This question of origin, to which the Natural History is devoted, turns out in 
the first instance to be a question of motive. Belief in an "invisible intelligent 
power" to whom prayers and sacrifices could be directed does not arise from 
"speculative curiosity" or "the pure love of truth." To lead people's attention 
beyond the immediacy of the here and now, "they must be actuated by some 
passion, which prompts their thought and reflection; some motive, which urges 
their first inquiry." Such motives include "the anxious concern for happiness, 
the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst of revenge, the appetite 
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for food and other necessaries." In short, the originating motive for the religious 
life is the hopes and fears of ordinary life, especially the latter. 6 
The hopes and fears that come to our attention in this way are not, at least 
not primarily, those which have been fashioned in the school of moral ideals. 
They are rather the hopes and fears of more or less immediate self-interest, and 
Hume sees them as constituting a "selfish view." It is this standpoint of self-
interest which Hume finds at the heart of "idolatry or polytheism."7 But since 
the negative effects which Hume sees as stemming from this "selfish view" 
belong to popular religion as such and are not limited to polytheism, it looks as 
if Hume is working toward a definition of idolatry or superstition-he uses the 
terms interchangeably-which depends more on the motivation of the believing 
soul than on the propositional content of belief. 
Hume gives special attention to two such effects. Where our relation to someone 
of superior power is primarily based on our hopes and fears of what we can get 
out of the relationship, the temptation is all but unavoidable to resort to flattery. 
The believing soul will naturally speak of adoration, but the suspicion of Hume 
detects adulation. Just to the degree that this suspicion is well founded, the 
relationship between believer and deity shows itself to be dishonest, founded on 
falsehood. 8 Naturally, if the believer is not shameless and cynical, it will be 
necessary not only to hide this dishonesty from the deity but from the believing 
soul as well. Piety becomes inseparable from self-deception. 
When piety is grounded in self-interest there is a second consequence, however, 
which reveals that the self-deception and dishonesty just noted do not remain 
internal to the relation between believer and deity. Hume notes that idolatrous 
worship is "liable to this great inconvenience, that any practice or opinion, 
however barbarous or corrupted, may be authorized by it," and that "the greatest 
crimes have been found, in many instances, compatible with a superstitious piety 
and devotion." He finds himself forced to ask, "What so pure as some of the 
morals, included in some theological systems? What so corrupt as some of the 
practices, to which these systems give rise?" And he immediately identifies such 
systems as "comfortable views."9 Once again it looks as if he is giving a contextual 
definition of idolatry and superstition as the comfortable views which provide 
moral and religious legitimation for the barbarous and criminal behaviors which 
self-interest often generates. 
Hume has intolerance and persecution particularly in mind, but the issue is 
obviously a general one. To ask about the origin of religion in human nature is 
not only to ask about the motives of the religious life, and thus about the 
inwardness of the believing soul; it is also to ask about the function of the 
religious life, and thus about the public behavior "compatible with" or "authorised 
by" it. 
Hume's suspicion of religion culminates in this question about the function 
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of faith. On his view reflection on religious beliefs can be neither serious nor 
complete until the question is posed: what practices (lifestyles, institutions) do 
these beliefs in fact (that is, in real life) serve to legitimate. This question of 
function does not replace the question of motive; for, as the later masters of the 
school of suspicion know full well, in a context where self-deception is all too 
possible, function is the best and sometimes the only key to motive. We find 
out what our real motives are only when we find out what role our beliefs actually 
play in our lives. 
Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud are the masters of the school of suspicion because 
they carry out this Humean project unrelentingly. Unlike Hume, they do so in 
the context of an unambiguous atheism. It seems to me, however, that it is not 
the aggressive and uncompromising nature of their atheism that should govern 
our response as Christian philosophers to them but rather its foundation in sus-
picion. For I believe, and this is the major point I want to make, that our response 
to the atheism of suspicion should be entirely different from our response to 
evidential atheism. 
I want to place my suggestion about our response to the atheism of suspicion 
in the context of AI Plantinga's timely advice to Christian philosophers, reminding 
us that we unavoidably wear two hats, one as Christian participants in the larger 
philosophical world and one as the philosophers of the Christian community, to 
which we belong in a more fundamental sense. 10 This community has its own 
philosophical needs, whether it recognizes them or not, and as the philosophers 
of the Christian community these needs are our task. There are times when both 
the topics we address and the audience to which we address ourselves need to 
be governed by this role. This is the fact which grounds my belief that the two 
kinds of atheism call for two kinds of response from us. 
Our primary response to evidential atheism, it seems to me, should be to seek 
to refute it. This can be done by trying to show that there is sufficient evidence 
to make religious beliefs (and the practices linked to them) rationally respectable. 
Or it can be done by challenging the way in which the evidentialist demands 
evidence. I shall not here discuss the relative merits of these strategies, though 
I will predict that the most recent challenge to evidentialism as such in the form 
of the so-called Calvinist epistemology is likely to be as central to the discussion 
of evidential atheism for the foreseeable future as discussion of invisible gardeners 
was a few decades ago. II 
Our primary response to the atheism of suspicion, by contrast, should not be 
attempted refutation but the acknowledgment that its critique is all too true all 
too much of the time. Further, while the apologetic refutation of evidential 
atheism is addressed to the unbeliever (even if the believer is the primary con-
sumer), the acknowledgment that Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud have described 
us all too accurately should be addressed to the community of believers. In short, 
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I am calling upon Christian philosophers to be the prophetic voices which chal-
lenge the Christian community to take seriously the critique of religion generated 
by suspicion and which show the Christian community how to do so fruitfully. 
To that end I want a) to indicate why I think this should be our response, b) to 
address two objections or potential obstacles to accepting this responsibility, and 
c) to illustrate, if ever so briefly, how to go about taking suspicion seriously. 
If the nasty things suspicion says about religion are indeed all too true all too 
much of the time, that would be sufficient reason to take suspicion seriously 
rather than to seek to refute it. The commitment of philosophy to the truth should 
be, if anything, deepened by our identity as Christian philosophers. We, of all 
people, should be the last to be interested in refuting the truth. 
But how can we be enabled to recognize in the diatribes of Marx, Nietzsche, 
and Freud the painful truth about ourselves? The best way, in my view, is to 
recognize the powerful parallel between their critique of religion and the biblical 
critique of religion. One has but to mention Jesus' critique of the Pharisees, 
Paul's critique of works righteousness, and James' critique of cheap grace to be 
reminded that the Christian faith has built into it a powerful polemic against 
certain kinds of religion, even if they are practiced in the name of the one true 
God. 12 These New Testament diatribes against false religion cannot be neutralized 
by appeals to either metaphysical orthodoxy or ritual rectitude and zeal, which 
is to say that the God of the New Testament transcends both metaphysics and 
ritual and cannot be captured by either or both. 
But this is not new. The same kind of critique permeates the Old Testament, 
whose writers know, in the words of Buber, that "if there is nothing that can so 
hide the face of our fellow-man as morality can, religion can hide from us as 
nothing else can the face of God. "I' The kinds of religion which can do this are 
forms of instrumental religion, the religion in which the sacred power becomes 
a means to the achieving of human ends. Instrumental religion need not violate 
the first two of the Ten Commandments, for it can be practiced in the name of 
Yahweh and without the aid of graven images. But it violates the third command-
ment, "You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain." In historical 
context this is not so much a prohibition of what we think of as swearing as it 
is of magical practices and conjuring. Commenting on this meaning of the third 
commandment, Von Rad gives in effect a helpful definition of instrumental 
religion. "Israel has been assailed at all periods by the temptation to use the 
divine power with the help of the divine name in an anti-social manner and to 
place it at the service of private and even sinister interests."14 
The Old Testament critique of instrumental religion finds its clearest expression 
in the sustained polemic, not against Israel's tendency to go "whoring" after 
other gods, but against religious practices, especially sacrifice, performed in 
Yahweh's own name. Sacrifice is unacceptable, even detestable, when it is 
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combined with disobedience to the revealed will of God. 15 More specifically, 
when sacrifice is "compatible with" economic exploitation and indifference 
toward the poor, allowing people to think that these practices are "authorised 
by" the halo of sanctity which shines forth from such rites, the rites themselves 
become sinful acts which evoke God's wrath and lead to punishment. 16 As one 
theologian has put it, in such circumstances "what is in fact required by Yahweh 
has become blasphemy."17 
Another way to put the same point would be to say that what is verbally the 
worship of the one true God has become idolatry. We might call it third command-
ment idolatry, for when we take God's name in vain by using religion to legitimate 
impious practices we worship in fact another god. In his Namia Chronicles C. 
S. Lewis has put the point succinctly. Tash is the false god of the pagan Calor-
menes, of whom Asian, the true God, says, "We are opposites." But Asian also 
says, "And if any man do a cruelty in my name, then though he says the name 
Asian, it is Tash whom he serves and by Tash his deed is accepted."IB 
Martin Buber has described "the degenerate sacrificial cult, in which the 
offering is changed from being a sign of the extreme self-devotion and becomes 
a ransom from all true self-devotion" as "the baalisation of YHVH Himself. "19 
Part of what it means to say that God is a jealous God is that he allows himself 
to be worshipped only in conformity with his character as it has been revealed 
to human understanding. Therefore, to seek to place the divine power at our 
disposal while freeing ourselves from responsibility to God's revealed will is to 
worship another god, no matter what name we use. In the ancient world magical 
practices were a primary way of doing this. In the modem world there are many 
creative variations on this theme of magical, instrumental religion; and it is 
precisely these that Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud are so good at exposing. Eager-
ness to refute the masters of suspicion rather than to take them seriously may 
well be a way of putting ourselves in the company of those who rejected Jesus 
and the prophets in biblical times. 
While reluctance to having our own personal and corporate idolatries exposed 
is no doubt the most serious obstacle to opening ourselves to suspicion's ques-
tioning, there are two lesser objections which deserve a response. The first comes 
from those most fully at home in Anglo-American philosophical traditions often 
lumped together under the rubric 'analytic'. It goes like this. It is not even clear 
that Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud are philosophers; but insofar as they are, their 
roots are in the lugubrious landscape of post-Kantian speculative metaphysics, 
in the un intelligibilities of people like Hegel and Schopenhauer. How can we 
be asked to try to understand them, let alone take them seriously? 
Hume is helpful here not only because he presents the structure of suspicion 
with such clarity, but also because he makes it clear that the hermeneutics of 
suspicion is not an idiosyncrasy of post-Kantian German culture. On the contrary, 
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suspicion turns out to be a very common and widespread part of our intellectual 
heritage. Hume's contemporary, Rousseau, applied it in the political sphere when 
describing the final stages of political decline. "Finally, when the State, close 
to its ruin, continues to subsist only in an illusory and ineffectual form; when 
the social bond is broken in all hearts; when the basest interest brazenly adopts 
the sacred name of the public good, then the general will becomes mute; all-
guided by secret motives-are no more citizens in offering their opinions than 
if the State had never existed, and iniquitous decrees whose only goal is the 
private interest are falsely passed under the name of laws. "20 
Hume's own suspicion can fruitfully be viewed as but the development of 
ideas presented by Francis Bacon in his critique of the Idols of the Tribe and 
Cave. ''The human understanding," writes Bacon, "is no dry light, but receives 
an infusion from the will and affections; whence proceed sciences which may 
be called 'sciences as one would.' For what a man had rather were true he 
more readily believes." Then, after referring to impatience, hope, superstition, 
arrogance, and pride, he comments, "Numberless in short are the ways, and 
sometimes imperceptible, in which the affections colour and infect the understand-
ing." This leads to the advice that every student of nature adopt the rule "that 
whatever his mind seizes and dwells upon with peculiar satisfaction is to be held 
in suspicion ... "2l 
In our own time suspicion plays a prominent role in Anglo-American moral 
philosophy. It is suspicion that leads Rawls to create the veil of ignorance in 
seeking to define justice. At least if Dworkin's interpretation is correct, the 
original position serves to filter out the self-deceptive self-interest which otherwise 
contaminates discussions of justice. "It supposes, reasonably, that political 
arrangements that do not display equal concern and respect are those that are 
established by powerfuL men and women who, whether they recognize it or not, 
have more concern and respect for members of a particular class, or people 
with particular talents or ideals, than they have for others." The veil of ignorance 
serves to make it impossible for those who determine the rules society will run 
on "to design institutions, consciously or unconsciously, to favor their own 
class. "22 
Similarly, it is suspicion that leads R. M. Hare to challenge anything more 
than a prima facie reliance on our prima facie moral institutions in asking what 
rights I may possess. "For people who ask this latter question will, being human, 
nearly always answer that they have just those rights, whatever they are, which 
will promote a distribution of goods which is in the interest of their own social 
group. The rhetoric of rights, which is engendered by this question, is a recipe 
for class war, and civil war. In pursuit of these rights, people will, because they 
have convinced themselves that justice demands it, inflict almost any harms on 
the rest of society and themselves."23 
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Alasdair MacIntyre goes even farther. In his view it is not only the concept 
of rights, but also the concept of utility, to which Hare appeals as a corrective, 
and even the concept of the efficiency of experts which he suspects of being 
moral fictions. By moral fictions he means concepts whose use is ironical but 
is not noticed to be so. Irony in its simplest form involves the discrepancy 
between the purported meaning and the actual use of discourse. The refrain from 
Mark Anthony's funeral oration is a familiar example, "But Brutus is an honorable 
man." The statement which presents itself as commendation actually functions 
to raise doubts and eventually to accuse. Similarly. MacIntyre argues. in contem-
porary moral discourse key concepts often purport to offer objective and imper-
sonal criteria while their use is actually that of rhetorical manipUlation in the 
service of unavowed interests. It is typical of the modem world that moral causes 
"offer a rhetoric which serves to conceal behind the masks of morality what are 
in fact the preferences of arbitrary will and desire ... "24 
A final example of the wide ranging contexts in which we encounter suspicion 
brings us back to religion rather than politics and morality as the target. It is 
from Augustine's Confessions. In the midst of the story of how the friends of 
Ponticianus were dramatically changed by reading the life of Antony, Augustine 
writes, "But you, Lord, while he was speaking, were turning me around so that 
I could see myself; you took me from behind my own back, which was where 
1 had put myself during the time when I did not want to be observed by myself. 
and you set me in front of my own face so that I could 5ee how foul a sight I 
was .. .If I tried to look away from myself. .. you were setting me in front of 
myself, forcing me to look into my own face, so that I might see my sin and 
hate it. I did know it, but I pretended that I did not. I had been pushing the 
whole idea away from me and forgetting it. "25 
Along with Sartre' s analysis of bad faith in Being and Nothingness this passage 
is the finest account I know of the nature of the self-deception which suspicion 
seeks to uncover. That of which we are fully aware we nevertheless manage not 
to notice because it is easier not to notice than to deal honestly with what is 
there to be noticed. Thus, to use a very apt figure of speech, we tum a blind 
eye to unwelcome facts.26 
It was only as he was freed from this kind of bad faith that Augustine was 
able to discover the origin, in the Humean sense, of his Manichean faith, the 
pride which was its motive and the self-justification which was its function. 27 
Not only was his religion "compatible" (Hume's term) with a lifestyle of which 
he himself did not approve, focused as it was on the pursuit of sexual pleasure, 
wealth, and social status; his religion "authorized" (Hume's term) his immoral 
behavior by providing a metaphysical theory which made him the innocent victim 
of an evil power outside himself. Augustine's primary complaint against the 
Manichean faith, once he had abandoned it, was not that it was false, but that 
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it functioned to legitimate a life of sin. 
One could multiply examples, but I think these are sufficient to indicate that 
one need not be on the road that leads from Hegel to what has been called die 
Derrida Krankheit to have sufficient doubts about the disinterestedness of thought 
to become suspicious that behind many, if not all, things bright and beautiful 
there lies motivated self-deception. Like Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, the thinkers 
just mentioned are fully aware of both the ironical discrepancy between official 
meaning and actual use and the need of the ironist to hide this, not just from 
others but especially from himself or herself. If Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud 
differ essentially from the others it is not by virtue of the philosophical traditions 
with which they are most closely associated, but rather because their critique of 
morals and politics is embedded in their critique of religion and because their 
critique of religion is directed, not toward some form of paganism, but primarily 
toward the theory and practice of orthodox biblical religion. In both these respects 
their critique stands in the closest relation to that of Jesus and the prophets. As 
such it can become a powerful tool for personal and corporate self-examination 
if we will open ourselves to it in honesty and humility. Perhaps it would not be 
going too far to think of suspicion as the hermeneutics of Lent. 
There is a second objection to taking suspicion seriously which deserves a 
reply. It goes like this. The atheism of suspicion involves the systematic practice 
of bad reasoning in the support of its unbelief. It combines the ad hominem and 
genetic fallacies and illegitimately infers the irrationality of religious belief and 
practice from the unfaithfulness of the believer. For the sake of truth and for 
the protection of the logically unsophisticated, it is important to point out the 
fallaciousness of these arguments. 
The first thing to be said in reply to this objection is to grant its point. Kant, 
for example, seeks to free his own moral ideals from precisely this kind of 
pseudo-refutation, and those who teach ethics to today's young people will surely 
have discovered how important and difficult it is to preserve ethical norms from 
the ultimate put-down: But people don't really act that way. 
Kant himself can be added to our list of those who practice suspicion. He 
knows that "innocence is a glorious thing," but also that it "is easily led astray." 
Because the inclinations represent a "powerful counterweight" to duty, there 
"arises a natural dialectic, i.e., a propensity to quibble with these strict laws of 
duty, to cast doubt upon their validity ... and to make them, where possible, more 
compatible with our wishes and inclinations." But it is not just by such amend-
ments to the moral law that self-interest corrupts the moral life. Even when we 
do the right thing we do not always do so for the right reason. Sometimes "after 
the keenest self-examination we can find nothing except the moral ground of 
duty that could have been strong enough to move us to this or that good action 
and to such great sacrifice. But there cannot with certainty be inferred from this 
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that some secret impulse of self-love, merely appearing as the idea of duty, was 
not the actual determining cause of the will. We like to flatter ourselves with 
the false claim to a more noble motive; but in fact we can never, even by the 
strictest examination, completely plumb the depths of the secret incentives of 
our actions. "28 
But while Kant insists that one need not be an "enemy of virtue" but only a 
"cool observer" to notice that "we everywhere come upon the dear self, which 
is always turning up, and upon which the intent of our actions is based rather 
than upon the strict command of duty," he insists that the strict imperatives of 
duty are not in the least bit discredited by this fact. Rather, "reason unrelentingly 
commands actions of which the world has perhaps hitherto never provided an 
example and whose feasibility might well be doubted by one who bases everything 
upon experience; for instance, even though there might never yet have been a 
sincere friend, still pure sincerity in friendship is nonetheless required of every 
man ... "29 
Ricoeur makes the same point in relation to the Freudian critique itself. He 
assumes "that psychoanalysis is necessarily iconoclastic, regardless of the faith 
or nonfaith of the psychoanalyst, and that this 'destruction' of religion can be 
the counterpart of a faith purified of all idolatry. Psychoanalysis as such cannot 
go beyond the necessity of iconoclasm. This necessity is open to a double 
possibility, that of faith and that of nonfaith, but the decision about these two 
possibilities does not rest with psychoanalysis .... The question remains open for 
every man whether the destruction of idols is without remainder; this question 
no longer falls within the competency of psychoanalysis. It has been said that 
Freud does not speak of God, but of god and the gods of men; what is involved 
is not the truth of the foundation of religious ideas but their function ... "30 This 
is precisely the point of the objection under consideration, that the question of 
truth and the question of function must be seen as two different questions. 
There is another way to return the fire of suspicion's atheists. It derives from 
Dostoyevsky's insight that the psychological argument cuts both ways. We can 
call it the et tu Brute strategy. To see the way it works we might begin with an 
example which does not directly bear upon the critique of religion. Suppose F. 
A. Hayek wants to use suspicion to discredit egalitarian appeals for greater justice 
in the distribution of society's wealth. To this end he first quotes Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., "I have no respect for the passion for equality, which seems to me 
merely idealizing envy." Then he adds his own commentary: "When we inquire 
into the justification of these demands, we find that they rest on the discontent 
that the success of some people often produces in those that are less successful, 
or, to put it bluntly, on envy. The modem tendency to gratify this passion and 
to disguise it in the respectable garment of social justice is developing into a 
serious threat to freedom .. .It is probably one of the essential conditions for the 
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preservation of [a free] society that we do not countenance envy, not sanction 
its demands by camouflaging it as social justice ... "31 
It is not easy to deny the presence of envy or even the spirit of revenge in the 
cries of the wretched of the earth. But it is very easy to tum the tables on Holmes 
and Hayek. Is it not obvious that all the noise about liberty is but a mask for 
the greed of those most highly favored by the natural and social lotteries which 
have distributed the abilities to do what our society most generously rewards? 
Is it not probably one of the essential conditions for the preservation of a just 
society that we do not countenance greed, not sanction its demands by camouf-
laging it as love of liberty? 
It is just as easy to play this game with, for example, Freud. He finds our 
belief in the God of Judeo-Christian theism to be a wish-fulfilling illusion derived 
from our sense of helplessness before the impersonal indifference of nature. 
Under those circumstances he thinks we "tell ourselves that it would be very 
nice if there were a God who created the world and was a benevolent Providence, 
and if there were a moral order in the universe and an after-life; but it is a very 
striking fact that all this is exactly as we are bound to wish it to be. "32 This is 
the origin, in the Humean sense, of God the Father. 
But both Freud's biography and his theory of the Oedipal complex testify to 
the fact that we have at least as powerful an inclination to hate and resent paternal 
power and authority as to long for it. Et tu Sigmunde. The pot is calling the 
kettle black. If our belief is a childish wish-fulfillment, is not your unbelief an 
adolescent rebellion combined with an infantile wish-fulfillment? 
It is unquestionably possible to score points against the atheism of suspicion 
using either of these two strategies. The problem is that one only wins Pyrrhic 
victories in this manner and ends up dead right, which is just as dead as dead 
wrong. One reason for this is that while the writings of Marx, Nietzsche, and 
Freud often encourage the reader to make the fallacious inferences in question, 
they never, or at least almost never, formally make the arguments themselves. 
In fact, they sometimes warn against confusing the questions of motive and 
function with the question of truth. For example, in The Future of An Illusion 
Freud is careful to note that while we have reason to be suspicious of illusions, 
which he defines as beliefs whose motivation includes wish-fulfillment as a 
"prominent factor," such beliefs may nevertheless be true. 33 
The reason why the atheists of suspicion need not formally rely on ad hominem 
or genetic arguments to establish their atheism is that if questioned about the 
grounds of their unbelief they would often reply in evidentialist terms. This is 
clearly the case in the instance just mentioned, Freud in The Future of An Illusion. 
There he gives a positivist, evidentialist rationale for his atheism. Whatever we 
cannot get from science in the way of justified belief simply cannot be justified. 34 
In general I think the typical atheist of suspicion, if pressed for the grounds of 
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that atheism, will give an evidentialist answer of some sort. The hermeneutics 
of suspicion is not so much an answer to the question, "How can we prove that 
religion is wrong?" as it is to the question, "Since we already know that it is 
wrong, how can we explain how it survives and has such int1uence?" To argue 
that atheistic conclusions do not follow from suspicion's descriptions, even if 
these are well founded, is to make a good point. But it is also to throw a knockout 
punch that doesn't land. 
But there is a more profound reason why attempting to refute or discredit the 
atheism of suspicion by either of the strategies under consideration is not an 
appropriate first response. The story of the Good Samaritan is introduced by an 
exchange between Jesus and a lawyer of the Pharisees about eternal life. The 
Pharisee is able to give the same magnificent two-fold summary of the law which 
Jesus himself gives on another occasion. But when Jesus tells him simply to do 
this and he will live he gets defensive. We read, "But he, desiring to justify 
himself, said to Jesus, 'And who is my neighbor?'" In itself this is a perfectly 
legitimate question, and in fact anyone seriously interested in the command of 
neighbor love is bound to ask it. But in the four simple words "desiring to justify 
himself' the narrative levels a devastating critique at the Pharisee. 35 
We open ourselves to precisely this same critique when our first response to 
Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud is to try to score points against them by either of 
the strategies we've just noted. In either case the points we raise are worth raising 
in themselves. But in the circumstances we discredit ourselves more than our 
unbelieving brothers by raising them. For we stand accused by their critique of 
being Pharisees, of practicing a religion which by virtue of its instrumentalism 
of self-interest is idolatrous by our own standards. If our first response is to 
defend ourselves by attacking them, we invite the impartial observer to say, 
"But they, willing to justify themselves, began to talk about ad hominem and 
genetic fallacies and to tum suspicion against the suspicious." Just as Jesus taught 
us to attend to the speck in our brother's eye only after removing the log from 
our own, so there will be plenty of time to make the points that need to be made 
against the atheism of suspicion after we have taken their critique seriously. 36 
There is a final reason why we should resist the immediate inclination to refute 
the atheism of suspicion. We have already noted that what presents itself as the 
love of liberty or justice can tum out under the cross examination of suspicion 
to be but greed or envy. Nietzsche is especially fond of making this point and 
finds an elegant German word play for doing so. He writes, "And when they 
say, 'I am just," rich bin gerechtl it always sounds like 'I am just-revenged 
rich bill geriicht]. "'17 The point is a general one about the irony of the moral 
life, that what presents itself as an altruistic virtue may be, in terms of motive 
and function, but an egoistic vice dressed up in its Sunday-go-to-meetin' clothes. 
John Howard Yoder makes the warning in appropriately general terms. "The 
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real temptation of good people like us is not the crude and the crass and the 
carnal, as those traits were defined in popular puritanism ... but [the temptation] 
of egocentric altruism; of being oneself the incarnation of a good and righteous 
cause for which others may rightly be made to suffer; of stating in the form of 
a duty to others one's self justification."'" 
One can, like Kant, who knows all about this discrepancy between meaning 
and use, insist that the ideal (or the belief, as the case may be) remains untainted 
by our empirical imperfections. But there is a better refutation of Nietzsche and 
company on this issue. It is in fact the only real refutation, and it is a practical 
one and not a theoretical one. It is to practice the virtue (or proclaim the belief) 
even when it is manifestly not in one's interest (as usually understood) to do so. 
If, for example, the call for socio-economic justice is discredited as the envy 
and greed of the poor, then let the wealthy, whose possessions would be fewer 
in a more nearly just society, be the ones who preach justice and begin to practice 
it through the voluntary adoption of a less affluent lifestyle. This is just what 
Jesus taught with reference to the virtue of hospitality when he said, "But when 
you give a feast, invite the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind, and you will 
be blessed, because they cannot repay you. "39 
There is an important point to note about this practical refutation of suspicion, 
and it has a bearing on the claim that our first response to suspicion should be 
to take it seriously. Unless we have already taken suspicion seriously and learned 
from its critique the pitfalls of ironical morality and instrumental religion, we 
will neither see the need for this response to suspicion nor know what sort of 
behavior would constitute such a response. According to the practical logic of 
the situation, the one truly unanswerable refutation of suspicion's critique cannot 
be our first response but can only be a subsequent response. 
There is an understandable hesitancy about subjecting our faith to a secular 
critique. Subjecting piety to suspicion may seem too much like casting pearls 
before swine. But perhaps Balaam's ass would provide a better metaphor, 
reminding us that God does not always speak to us through official priestly 
voices. While discussing the role of secular theories of justice in Christian ethics, 
Al Verhey makes a point which has a more general application to our problem. 
"In that dialogue such theories may challenge and judge certain claims made on 
the basis of Scripture. Scripture has, after all, been used to justify racial and 
sexual discrimination; it has been used to justify 'holy wars,' crusades, and 
inquisitions; it has been used to justify the abuse of power and the violation of 
the rights and integrity of others in order to pursue what has been taken to be 
God's cause. Secular moral wisdom, and especially the principle of justice, has 
sometimes challenged such uses of Scripture and led the church to reconsider 
particular practices and to repent of them. We must note that it is not the authority 
of Scripture itself that comes under criticism and review here, but authorizations 
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for the use of Scripture .. .In the churches Scripture itself has sometimes finally 
corroborated the judgments of secular morality and been vindicated against both 
its detractors and its so-called defenders in such cases. "40 
I would like to conclude this invitation for you to join me in your own way 
in the project I've been describing with a single example of the sort of thing I 
have in mind and a warning. The example comes from Freud's discussion of 
the taboo upon rulers in Totem and Taboo. In the theories of the ruler's sanctity 
and especially in the ceremonials in which it is celebrated in some cultures, 
Freud detects the same deep seated ambivalence and compromise formation that 
he first encountered in his neurotic patients, where love and hate, duty and 
inclination often co-exist most ingeniously. 
This phenomenon can be seen in the elaborate protection rituals of sacred 
rulers like the Mikado of Japan. "It must strike us as self-contradictory," writes 
Freud, "that persons of such unlimited power should need to be protected so 
carefully from the threat of danger; but that is not the only contradiction ... For 
these people also think it necessary to keep a watch on their king to see that he 
makes a proper use of his powers." Freud then quotes Frazer about this proper 
use. In such societies the sovereign "exists only for his subjects; his life is only 
valuable so long as he discharges the duties of his position by ordering the course 
of nature for his people's benefit. So soon as he fails to do so, the care, the 
devotion, the religious homage which they had hitherto lavished on him cease 
and are changed into hatred and contempt; he is dismissed ignominiously, and 
may be thankful if he escapes with his life. Worshipped as a god one day, he 
is killed as a criminal the next. .. A king of this sort lives hedged in by a cere-
monious etiquette, a network of prohibitions and observances, of which the 
intention is not to contribute to his dignity, much less his comfort, but to restrain 
him from conduct which, by disturbing the harmony of nature, might involve 
himself, his people, and the universe in one common catastrophe. "41 
Another example Freud gives from Frazer concerns the Timmes people from 
Sierra Leone, "who elect their king, reserve to themselves the right of beating 
him on the eve of his coronation; and they avail themselves of this constitutional 
privilege with such healty goodwill that sometimes the unhappy monarch does 
not long survive his elevation to the throne." To which Freud adds, "Even in 
glaring instances like this, however, the hostility is not admitted as such, but 
masquerades as a ceremonial. "42 
Needless to say, the official meaning of such ceremonials is veneration, affec-
tion, and homage, even when their motivation is envy and hostility and their 
function is to seize control of the sacred power embodied in the ruler. Here is 
the finest coup d' etat one could imagine, for the effectiveness of the rebellion 
consists precisely in its being unacknowledged and unnoticed. Such a king is 
"hedged in" by rites which "restrain" him and "annihilate his freedom," even 
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though they purport to "contribute to his dignity ."43 I am reminded of the Mother's 
Day celebrations of my childhood, in which the restriction of women to one 
particular role in society was reinforced and legitimated by rites of veneration 
in which Mother was placed on a pedestal as Queen for a Day. 
Freud's question, of course, is not addressed to Japan or Sierra Leone but to 
his Jewish and Christian contemporaries and to us. To what degree does our 
worship, like that on the first Palm Sunday, honor in order to domesticate divine 
power, seeking to tum AsIan into a watchdog, or a hunting dog, or even a lap 
dog? Theory is as much at issue as practice. For the metaphysical compliments 
which our theology throws in God's direction are also capable of a variety of 
different functions. To discover the actual function of both our theology and our 
worship would be the task of the king of self-examination the masters of suspicion 
lay before us. 
Finally a word of warning. Suspicion easily turns sour. MacIntyre wisely 
warns against the aesthete, whose suspicion sees through everything and is 
deceived by nothing except its own cynicism. It is all too easy to become the 
Sunday School teacher who, at the end of a lesson on the Pharisee and publican 
who went up to the temple to pray, said, "And now, children, let us fold our 
hands and close our eyes and thank God that we are not like that Pharisee." We 
need to remind ourselves that our role is not to pass judgment on the sincerity 
of others, nor even to earn points with God by the purity of our own hearts; and 
so we will have to learn even to be suspicious of our suspicion. But we will 
first need to learn to be suspicious of our reluctance to learn the kind of self-exam-
ination that Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud can teach us. 
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